Given some consensus that statistical significance tests are broken, misused, or at least have somewhat limited utility, the focus of discussion within the field ought to move beyond additional bashing of statistical significance tests, and toward more constructive suggestions for improved practice. Five suggestions for improved practice are recommended:
A few years ago Pedhazur and Schmelkin (1991) asserted that "probably very few methodological issues have generated as much controversy" (p. 198) as have the use and interpretation of statistical significance tests. These tests have certainly proven surprisingly resistant to repeated efforts to "to exorcise the null hypothesis" (Cronbach, 1975, p. 124) . Particularly noteworthy among the historical efforts to accomplish the exorcism have been works by Rozeboom (1960) , Morrison and Henkel (1970) , Carver (1978) , Meehl (1978) , Shaver (1985) , and Oakes (1986 In a public-domain brief digest disseminated as a class handout by the U.S. Department of Education Educational Resources Information Center, Thompson (1994a) provided some simple tests of understanding of what io-,-A-ALCULATED actually evaluates:
In which one of each of the following [three] pairs of studies will the pcu,cmAnm be smaller?
--In two studies each involving three groups of subjects each of size 30, in one study the means were 100, 100, and 90, and in the second study the means were 100, 100, and 100.
--In two studies each comparing the standard deviations (SD) of scores on the dependent variable of two groups of subjects, in both studies SDI = 4 and SD2 = 3, but in study one the sample sizes were 100 and 100, while in study two the samples sizes were 50 and 50.
--In two studies involving a multiple regression prediction of Y using predictors X,, X2, and X3, and both with samples sizes of 75, in study one R2 = .49 and in study two R2 = .25. [these tests] with what appear to be magical powers" (Pedhazur & Schmelkin, 1991, p. 198) . And some of us try to use 2 values to cling to a mantle of unattainable objectivity.
The use of statistical tests has recently stimulated yet more controversy. Contemporary commentaries include those provided by Hunter (1997) , Kirk (1996) , Schmidt (1996) , and Thompson (1996, 1997) . The less positive treatments of statistical significance tests have also provoked reactions from test advocates (cf. Chow, 1988; Frick, 1996; Hagen, 1997; Greenwald, Gonzalez, Harris & Guthrie, 1996; Robinson & Levin, 1997 ). Yet even Frick (1996) acknowledged that critics of conventional practices "usefully point 'For each of the three pairs of studies, the first study within each pair has a smaller pcmcuLATED value, if conventional nil null hypotheses (i.e., He: MI = 142 = M3; Hp: SDI = SD2; and R2 = 0) are used.
out the limitations of null hypothesis testing" (p. 388).
Given growing consciousness regarding these limitations, the APA Board of Scientific Affairs recently named a Task Force on Statistical Inference (Shea, 1996) . The APA Task Force is charged with recommending policies and practices leading to more informed and thoughtful statistical analyses, including those involving the use of statistical significance tests.
Articles within the American Psychologist, published on a seemingly periodic basic, have especially informed the movement of the field as regards statistical significance testing. Table 1 lists some of these articles, and also reports citation frequencies for the articles as of 1996. These American Psychologist articles, and the related comments published within the journal, have considerably influenced psychology and the social sciences more generally. For example, Roger Kirk (1996) characterized the two American Psychologist articles by Cohen as "classics," and argued that "the one individual most responsible for bringing the shortcomings of hypothesis testing to the attention of behavioral and educational researchers is Jacob Cohen" (p. 747).
INSERT Carver, 1978 Carver, , 1993 . However, the fact that many psychologists misinterpret statistical significance tests is not a reasonable warrant for banning these tests. As Strike (1979) explained, "To deduce a proposition with an 'ought' in it from premises containing only 'is' assertions is to get something in the conclusion not contained in the premises, something impossible in a valid deductive argument" (p. 13). In logic this fallacy is called a "should/would" or "is/ought" error (Hudson, 1969) .
But more and more researchers also now realize that "virtually any study can be made to show [statistically] significant results if one uses enough subjects" (Hays, 1981, p. 293) . This means that Statistical significance testing can involve a tautological logic in which tired researchers, having collected data from hundreds of subjects, then conduct a statistical test to evaluate whether there were a lot of subjects, which the researchers already know, because they collected the data and know they're tired. (Thompson, 1992b, p. 436) Consequently, attention has now turned toward ways to improve practice. Five potential improvements in practice are suggested here.
Effect Size Reportina
Empirical studies of articles published since 1994 in psychology, counseling, special education, and general education suggest that merely "encouraging" effect size reporting (APA, 1994) has not appreciably affected actual reporting practices (e.g., Kirk, 1996; Snyder & Thompson, 1997; Thompson & Snyder, in press-a, in press-b; Vacha-Haase & Nilson, in press). Apparently, when it comes to reporting and interpreting effect sizes, many are called but few choose to be chosen. Consequently, editorial policies at some journals now require authors to report and interpret effect sizes (Heldref Foundation, 1997; Thompson, 1994b ; see also Loftus, 1993, and Shrout, 1997) .
Effect sizes are important to report and interpret for at least two reasons. First, these indices can help inform judgment regarding the practical or substantive significance of results.
Statistical significance tests do not bear upon the noteworthiness of results, because improbable events are not necessarily important (see Shaver's (1985) classic example), and because "if the null hypothesis is not rejected, it is usually [only] because the N is too small" (Nunnally, 1960, p. 643 Second, some researchers seem to have adopted Cohen's (1988) definitions of small, medium and large effects with the same rigidity that "a=.05" has been adopted.
Such rigidity is inappropriate. Cohen (1988) only intended these as impressionistic characterizations of result typicality across a diverse literature, and not as rigid universal criteria. However, some empirical studies suggest that the characterization is reasonably accurate (Glass, 1979; Olejnik, 1984) at least as regards a literature historically built with a bias against statistically nonsignificant results (Rosenthal, 1979) .
Notwithstanding these caveats, it is suggested that all authors of quantitative studies should report and interpret effect sizes. Because merely encouraging these practices has to date had little or no effect, at some point it may become necessary to require that effect sizes are reported. Of course, a requirement that effect sizes be reported does not inherently require that a whole new system of statistical analyses be invoked; all our classical analytic methods can be used to yield both RCA and effect size values, even though the methods have traditionally been used only for the first purpose.
Effect Size Interpretability
There are myriad effect sizes from which the researcher can choose. Useful reviews of the choices have been provided by Kirk (1996) , Snyder and Lawson (1993) , and Friedman (1968) , among others.
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Statistical Significance -12-Effect sizes can be categorized into two broad classes:
variance-accounted-for measures (e.g., R2, eta2) and standardized differences (e.g., Cohen's d, Hedges' g) [Kirk (1996) experimental and some are not (Knapp, 1978; Thompson, in press ).
Furthermore, effect sizes can be further subdivided as being either "uncorrected" (e.g., R2, eta2) or "corrected" It is doubtful that the field will ever settle on a single index to be used in all studies, given that so many choices exist and because the statistics can usually be translated into approximations across the two major classes.
However, some pluses and minuses for both variance-accounted-for and standardized differences indices can be noted.
On the one hand, variance-accounted-for indices do have the benefit of reinforcing the realization that all classical analyses are correlational (Knapp, 1978; Thompson, in press ). This may minimize the autonomic choice of ANOVA as an analytic method based on an unconscious association of ANOVA with the ability to make causal inferences (cf. Humphreys & Fleishman, 1974 The required nature of this warrant has received too little attention in an era when statistical significance tests were thought to evaluate result replicability, when these tests were thought to evaluate (rather than merely to presume) selected population parameters. Several vehicles for establishing these warrants can be noted.
One warrant involves an important contribution that Jacob
Cohen made in his 1994 article; this very important contribution has not been as widely noticed as might be hoped (Hagen, 1997) . Cohen (1994) recognizes that a "null hypothesis means the hypothesis to be nullified, not necessarily a hypothesis of no difference" (Chow, 1988, p. 105).
Some specific null must be presumed true in the population, or otherwise infinitely many parameters are possible and the PCALCULATED for the sample results becomes indeterminate (Thompson, 1996) . Most researchers use a nil hypothesis as the null partly because this is what most computer packages assume, and partly because methodology for invoking non-nil null hypotheses has some "complexity, and it
is not yet readily applicable in many designs" (Dar, Serlin, & Omer, 1994, p. 81) .
The mindless use of the nil hypothesis obviates the necessity prospectively to extrapolate thoughtful expected effect sizes from prior literature as part of study design. Furthermore, the interpretation of " [statistical] significance" as indicating result value means that some researchers do not retrospectively interpret their study effects in the context of specific previous findings.
These failures are most unfortunate, because the prospective and retrospective use of effects from prior studies is itself a check on the replicability of results in a given inquiry.
Statistical Significance -18-Empirical evidence for result replicability can either be "external" or "internal" (Thompson, 1993 (Thompson, , 1996 because some researchers thought they were already testing replicability by conducting statistical significance tests.
"Internal" replicability analyses use the sample in hand to combine the participants in different ways to try to estimate how much the idiosyncracies of individuality within the sample have compromised sample results. The major "internal" replicability analyses are cross-validation, the jackknife, and the bootstrap (Diaconis & Efron, 1983) ; the logics are reviewed in more detail elsewhere (cf. Thompson, 1993 Thompson, , 1994c ).
"Internal" evidence for replicability is never as good as an actual replication (Robinson & Levin, 1997; Thompson, 1997) , but is certainly better than presuming that a statistical significance test assures result replicability. And such "internal" replicability evidence is useful for researchers who for practical reasons cannot externally replicate all results prior to graduation or tenure review.
It is important that these logics when used to evaluate result replicability are not confused with other uses of the same logics (Thompson, 1993) . For example, the inferential use of the bootstrap involves using the bootstrap to estimate a sampling distribution when the sampling distribution is not known or assumptions for the use of a known sampling distribution cannot be met. The descriptive i 9
Statistical Significance -19-use of the bootstrap looks primarily at the variance in parameter estimates across many different combinations of the participants.
The inferential application requires considerably more "resamples" (see Thompson, 1994c) than the descriptive application recommended here. This is because the inferential focus is on the tails of the estimated sampling distribution (e.g., the 95th percentile of the distribution, for a one-tailed statistical significance test), rather than the descriptive focus on the standard deviation (i.e., the "standard error") of the sampling The field has not yet resolved all the issues involved in establishing a sufficient warrant for result replicability, again, perhaps because some authors incorrectly assumed that statistical tests evaluated the population. The relevant software to conduct "internal" bootstrap analyses is already available (e.g., Lunneborg (1987) for univariate applications, and Thompson (1992a Thompson ( , 1995 for multivariate applications). Because replicability evidence is critical to the cumulation of knowledge, more authors should be expected to provide some evidence of result replicability.
Reporting Confidence Intervals
Various scholars have recommended that confidence intervals should be used to replace or supplement statistical significance tests (e.g., Dar, Serlin, & Omer, 1994; Meehl, 1997; Schmidt, 1996; Serlin, 1993) . However, researchers using confidence intervals must remember that "the interval endpoints are themselves random variables" (Zwick, 1997, p. 5) also estimated using sample data.
Furthermore, researchers who mindlessly interpret confidence intervals only against the standard of whether the interval subsumes zero are doing nothing more than a mindless "nil" hypothesis test (Cortina & Dunlap, 1997 (Rosenthal, 1979) , such Type I errors are afforded priority for publication, but the replications with statistically non-significant results will compete at a disadvantage for journal space, and so the self-correction of science through replication will be impeded. Greenwald (1975) Kirk (1996) recently noted that, "Our science has paid a high price for its ritualistic adherence to null hypothesis significance testing" (p. 756).
The overuse and misinterpretation of statistical tests has been frequently decried as well in literatures other than psychology, including medicine (Kraemer, 1992; Pocock, Hughes & Lee, 1987) , business (Sawyer & Peter, 1983), occupational therapy (Ottenbacher, 1984) , and speech and hearing (Young, 1993) . Nevertheless, the use of statistical significance tests remains common, and some empirical studies reflect even an increased use of these methods (Parker, 1990)! Many have marveled at the robustness of the statistical significance logic against the application of the wooden stake through the heart. For example, Falk and Greenbaum (1995) 
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